In this research we consider the problem of detecting malicious Java applets, based on static analysis. Dynamic analysis can be more informative, since it is immune to many common obfuscation techniques, while static analysis is often more efficient, since it does not require code execution or emulation. Consequently, static analysis is generally preferred, provided the results are comparable to those obtained using dynamic analysis. We conduct experiments using three techniques that have been employed in previous studies of metamorphic malware. We show that our static approach can detect malicious Java applets with greater accuracy than previously published research that relied on dynamic analysis.
INTRODUCTION
As with most Java applications, Java applets typically consist of a set of compiled Java classes, usually bundled in a jar archive. Applets are generally embedded within HTML pages, explicitly specifying the main class as well as additional parameters that should be provided to the applet. To protect the host from unrestricted access, Java applets are subject to a security manager. Malicious applets try to disable this security manager, allowing them to access restricted resources. For example, a malicious applet might attempt to download and execute a malicious binary.
Our goal here is to perform static analysis of Java applets using three previously-developed techniques. Specifically, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. we test the Hidden Markov Model method from [22] , the Opcode Graph Similarity technique from [15] , and the Simple Substitution Distance from [16] . For all of these scores, we use bytecodes extracted from applets. We compare our results to the dynamic analysis technique in [10] , using the same data sets, and we show that our static approach yields better results than the more costly dynamic analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains relevant background information. Section 3 gives an overview of static and dynamic analysis. We also include a discussion of previous work involving dynamic analysis to which we are comparing our results. Section 4 gives our experimental results. Finally, Section 5 contains our conclusions and a brief discussion of future work.
BACKGROUND
This section provides a summary of malware detection techniques, followed by a brief discussion of code obfuscation, and a quick overview of Java applets. Then we introduce the three static detection techniques that are employed in this research, namely, Hidden Markov Models, Bytecode Graph Similarity, and Simple Substitution Distance.
Malware Detection
Signature detection is the most common method that antivirus software uses to identify malware. A signature is generally a string of bits found in a file, which might include wildcards. Signature scanning consists of pattern matching [1] . Other general approaches to malware detection include change detection and anomaly detection [1] .
In the research literature, a large number of advanced malware detection techniques based on static analysis have been considered. Roughly speaking, these can be classified as statistical-based [16, 19, 22] , graph-based [7, 13, 15] , and structural-based [2] , or some combination thereof. For the experiments reported here, we employ the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based detection scheme in [22] , the Bytecode Graph Similarity (BGS) method in [15] , and the Simple Substitution Distance (SSD) in [16] . The HMM and SSD scores are statistical-based, while the BGS score is graph-based. We provide additional details on these techniques and their use in malware detection in Sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, respectively.
Code Obfuscation
According to [10] , the Java applets that we analyze in Section 4 use a wide variety of obfuscation techniques. The purpose of obfuscation is typically to evade signature-based detection, but in some cases it can also serve to evade more advanced detection strategies [12, 17] .
At a high level, code obfuscation relies on some combination of insertion, deletion, substitution, and transposition. In [4] , it is proved that transposition alone is sufficient to defeat signature detection, and the proof is constructive, with the resulting obfuscation method being practical. However, in [20] , it is shown that the transposition method from [4] is ineffective against the HMM-based technique developed in [22] . That is, a straightforward transposition technique has relatively little effect on the statistical properties of the code.
Overview of Java Applets
Java programs comes in two forms, namely, standard applications and applets [3] . Standard applications run on their own, whereas applets run inside a web page. An applet is generally a small application and it is delivered to users in the form of bytecode.
The user launches a Java applet from a web page, and the applet is then executed within a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) in a process that is separate from the web browser itself. The executable code of the applet is downloaded along with the text of the page. Once the code arrives from the server, it is executed by the browser on the local machine. This allows the developer to incorporate dynamic features in Web pages.
The infrastructure required to support applets is built into the Web browser. The environment provided by the browser insulates the applet from the underlying operating system and allows it to function on any platform on which a Java-enabled browser is available. Applet code is inherently compact. Standard libraries-such as libraries for graphical user interfaces and network access-are provided on the client platform. Hence, only the code that is unique to the applet needs to be transferred across the network.
Hidden Markov Models
As the name suggests, a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) consists of a Markov process, where the underlying states are hidden. In an HMM, we have a series of observations that are related to the hidden states by fixed probability distributions. An HMM can be viewed as machine learning technique and an HMM can also be viewed as a discrete hill technique, since hill climbing is used in the training phase where we determine the model parameters, based on the observations.
In this research, we extract bytecode sequences from a collection of malicious applets that are known to belong to a given family. We append the sequences to yield one long bytecode sequence. Then we train an HMM on this bytecode sequence. Given an applet that we want to score, we extract its bytecode sequence and score it against this HMM model A higher (log odds) score indicates that the applet in question matches the family used to train the model, while a low score indicates that the applet is not "close" to the applets in the family. In this way, we can classify applets as being members of a specific family of malicious applets, or not.
For additional details on HMMs in general, see [14, 18] . For more information on HMMs as used in malware research, see [22] or the report [9] .
Bytecode Graph Similarity
Bytecode Graph Similarity (BGS) is a graph-based scoring technique based on extracted bytecode sequences [15] . In this technique, a graph is constructed based on the digram frequency of bytecode sequences from malicious applets belonging to a specific family. We refer to this as the family graph.
A similar process is used to construct a graph for a given applet that we want to score. We refer to this as the applet graph. A score is generated by calculating the distance between the applet graph and the family graph.
Given an applet, the sequence of bytecodes is extracted and a weighted directed applet graph is constructed based on digraph frequencies. Next, we give an example to illustrate this graph construction process. Table 1 contains a matrix derived from the digraph counts of a bytecode sequence. For example, the value in row 1 and column 3 is 2, which indicates that the bytecode ldc is followed by iconst twice in the original bytecode sequence. 
Next, we convert the counts in Table 1 to probabilities by dividing each element by its corresponding row sum (provided the row sum is greater than zero). That is, we convert the count matrix into a row-stochastic probability matrix. The probability matrix thus constructed can be viewed as a bytecode graph, where each node represents a unique bytecode. In this bytecode graph, a directed edge is drawn from one bytecode to another, provided there is a non-zero probability in the corresponding position of the probability matrix. Edge weights are assigned to the graph directly from the probability matrix.
To construct a family graph, the same process is used, except that bytecode digraph statistics for a set of applets belonging to the same family are used. The process of constructing the family graph can be viewed as the training phase. Given the extracted bytecode sequences, training is extremely efficient.
Scoring a given applet against a specific family is extremely efficient. We construct the bytecode graph for the given applet, and we sum the absolute differences of its probability matrix with that of the family graph. The score is always non-negative, and an exact match yields a score of zero. Thus, the smaller the score, the better the applet matches the statistics of the family, and hence the more likely that it belongs to the same family.
Since the bytcode graph is constructed to be row stochastic, the BGS score weights all bytecodes equally. That is, the most common bytecode has no more influence on the bytecode graph score than a rare bytecode. This is in contrast to an HMM score, for example, where bytecodes are weighted according to their relative frequencies. This emphasis on rare features can be an effective means of detecting certain malware families [15] .
Simple Substitution Distance
In [16] a novel malware score based on simple substitution cryptanalysis is developed and analyzed. When using this score, we consider the file to be scored as an encrypted version of a given malware family. We then try to decrypt the file, and the better the resulting decryption, the higher the score. Note that the file is not actually encrypted, but a member of a given malware family can be viewed as an obfuscated element of the family. And, simple substitution encryption is more akin to obfuscation than strong encryption. Consequently, the decryption process is a form of deobfuscation, and the better we can de-obfuscate, relative to a given family, the more likely that the file is a member of the family.
The Simple Substitution Distance (SSD) method in [16] uses a fast hill climbing technique based on Jakobsen's algorithm [11] . To compute a Simple Substitution Distance score for an applet, we first extract bytecode sequences from a large number of members of a given malicious applet family. We use these bytecodes to construct a family bytecode digraph distribution matrix. Then, given an applet that we want to classify, we extract its bytecode sequence and generate the corresponding matrix. We restrict to the most frequent bytecodes, with symbol + 1 used to denote all other bytecodes. In Section 4, we experiment with different values of .
For example, suppose that the only bytecodes that appear in the family applets, arranged in descending order of frequency, are bipush, aload, ldc, pop, and iload Next, assume that the extracted bytecode sequence from the applet we want to score is iconst, bipush, bipush, ldc, lstore, lstore, lstore (1)
Consequently, our initial guess for the "key" is Applet Family bipush aload ldc pop File to Score lstore bipush ldc iconst And, the result of "decrypting" the sequence (1) using this key is pop, aload, aload, ldc, bipush, bipush, bipush
From the sequence (2), we obtain the initial decryption matrix ,
Therefore, in Jakobsen's algorithm, we "decrypt" the sequence once-all subsequent score computations only require elementary matrix manipulations, which yields an efficeient scoring computation. The score for the final matrix gives the SSD score for the bytecode sequence.
PREVIOUS WORK
In this section, we first briefly discuss the tradeoffs between static analysis and dynamic analysis in the context of malware detection. Then we turn our attention to the main topic of the section, namely, HoneyAgent, a dynamic analysis tool that has previously been applied to the problem of detecting malicious Java applets [10] . In Section 4, we compare detection results obtained using static techniques to those obtained using HoneyAgent.
Static and Dynamic Analysis
Static analysis is the evaluation of code by means that do not require execution. For example, compiler optimizations rely on static analyses [8] . The static analysis techniques that we consider in Section 4 rely entirely on information obtained from bytecode sequences extracted from applets.
In contrast to static analysis, dynamic analysis consists of testing and evaluation of an application at runtime. Dynamic analysis operates by executing (or emulating) a program and observing the results. If the code is executed (as opposed to being emulated), dynamic analysis is precise, in the sense that no approximation or abstraction needs to be done-we can examine actual run-time behavior of the program. However, it is unlikely that dynamic analysis can test all branches and hence some parts of the code will almost certainly remain out of view during such analysis.
In terms of malware detection, static analysis is generally more efficient than dynamic analysis. On the other hand, dynamic analysis defeats some types of obfuscation. For example, dead code will disappear when dynamic analysis is employed, but can be very difficult to automatically detect during static analysis. Due to its efficiency, static analysis is preferred, provided it is as effective as dynamic analysis.
HoneyAgent
The developers of HoneyAgent [10] suggest that reliable detection of obfuscated Java applets requires dynamic analysis. This seems plausible, since dynamic analysis can, in effect, strip away one layer of obfuscation. However, a wide variety of static techniques have yielded strong results when applied to highly obfuscated metamorphic malware; for examples of such work, see [2, 13, 15, 16, 19, 22] . Our goal in this research is to compare the specific static techniques in [15, 16, 22] to the dynamic detection results obtained using HoneyAgent in [10] . The HMM-based technique in [22] has served as a benchmark in many other studies of malware detection techniques, while the scores analyzed in [15] and [16] are superior to HMMs in some challenging cases.
HoneyAgent [10] is designed to analyze the runtime behavior of Java applets. It observes the interaction between a Java applet and the default Java Runtime Environment (JRE) to detect actions such as file downloads, changes to the file system, and process creation. By intercepting the respective function calls, HoneyAgent prevents changes to its host system while remaining invisible to the applet being analyzed. The HoneyAgent tool also simulates the effect of successful exploitation of some common vulnerabilities, allowing for a more comprehensive analysis of the malicious applet. The net effect is that by applying a relatively small set of heuristics to observed runtime behavior, HoneyAgent can successfully identify malicious Java applets with a high degree of certainty, and without human intervention.
At runtime, an applet interacts with the runtime environment. Thus, in any dynamic analysis system, it is necessary to provide an environment resembling the one an applet would expect on a vulnerable system, as well as to hide the code used for analysis as far as possible. This is the major challenge in dynamic analysis of Java applets. In contrast, no such environment is necessary in the case of static analysis, which makes for a much simpler process.
HoneyAgent is implemented as a Java agent [10] . Thus it is able to perform all interactions required to trace the behavior of an examined Java applet. The agent library cannot be accessed from within the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), which hinders malicious Java applets from detecting the presence of HoneyAgent.
HoneyAgent includes a variety of advanced features. For example, it intercepts all calls to API methods performed by the examined applet and reconstructs the parameters used by inspecting the current stack frame. This allows HoneyAgent to determine the behavior of the examined applet without requiring the massive runtime overhead introduced by breaking on every method call.
Java applets are executed within a sandbox, which thereby restricts the actions of the applet within the host. Malicious applets might try to interact with the host to, for example, install a malicious binary. Thus, HoneyAgent considers an applet malicious if it tries to perform such a prohibited activity.
In the HoneyAgent paper [10] , only unsigned applets are considered for analysis. Applets signed with a valid and trusted certificate are executed without any security restrictions just like classic Java applications. Therefore, these applets would be allowed to perform functions that would otherwise be indicative of a malicious applet. Here, we use the same datasets as in [10] .
Datasets
One set of malicious applets analyzed in [10] was obtained from VirusTotal [21] . The other dataset was taken from the Contagio malware dump [6] . For the research in this paper, we have used the same malicious datasets and the same benign dataset as in [10] . The number of files in each of these datasets is given in Table 2 . According to [10] , HoneyAgent was able to successfully detect malicious behavior in 94% of all samples from the Contagio dataset and 97% in the VirusTotal dataset, without generating any false positives for the benign applets. This yields in an overall detection rate of 96%. In the next section, we show that we can do somewhat better overall using an approach based only on features extracted via static analysis.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present experimental results for three static detection techniques applied to Java applets. Specifically, we consider the Hidden Markov Model (HMM), Bytecode Graph Similarity (BGS), and Simple Substitution Distance (SSD) scores that were discussed in detail in Sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, respectively. We compare our results to those obtained using the dynamic analysis tool, HoneyAgent [10] . Then we attempt to improve on these scoring results by reducing the number of bytecode categories based on edit distance. But first we briefly describe the process used to extract the bytecodes.
Extracting Bytecodes
Java applets consist of compiled Java classes which are usually bundled in a jar archive. The command jar xf <jar-file-name> extracts the contents of the specified .jar file. We then use javap to disassemble the Java .class files into bytecodes. The specific command used is javap -c <class-file-name>.class Figure 1 gives an example of the resulting output, from which the bytecodes (highlighted in blue) are easily extracted.
HMM Score
For these experiments, we use 5-fold cross validation. That is, we partition the dataset under consideration into five equal-sized subsets, say, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Then we train an HMM on sets 1, 2, 3, and 4. The resulting HMM is used to score the files in 4 and all of the benign files. This process is then repeated four more times, with a different subset reserved for testing in each "fold". The results of the five folds are combined into one scatterplot, an ROC curve is generated, and the AUC is computed [5] . Cross validation serves to smooth out any biases in the data, and also maximizes the number of score calculations for a given size of dataset.
For the HMM score, these initial experiments yield the AUC values in Table 3 . From these results, we see that the HMM performs better than HoneyAgent on the Contagio data, but much worse on the VirusTotal data. 
BGS Score
Next, we consider the Bytecode Graph Similarity score, as described in Section 2.5. The experimental process used here is similar to that for the HMM score, as discussed above. However, for the BGS score, recall that we need to select the parameter , the number of highest-frequency bytecodes used to construct the graph (with all remaining bytecodes grouped together in the "other" category, giving + 1 categories). We experimented with various values of to obtain the results in Table 4 .
From Table 4 , we see that the optimal result for the Contagio dataset in 0.9895, while the optimal result for VirusTotal is 0.9766. The comparable HoneyAgent numbers are given in Table 3 . The BGS score performs better than HoneyAgent on both datasets.
SSD Score
For the Simple Substitution Distance score, the training and scoring process is similar to that used for the HMM and BGS scores. As in the BGS score, we optimize over the parameter , which is the number of the most frequent bytecodes used for scoring. Again, all bytecode outside of these top are lumped together in the "other" category. In this way, the resulting scoring matrices will be less sparse, and previous work has shown that this generally results in significantly stronger scores [16] . A summary of the AUC values for the SSD score over a range of choices of is given in Table 5 . In this case, the best result for Contagio is 0.9357, while the best result for VirusTotal is 0.9445. The comparable HoneyAgent numbers are given in Table 3 . The SSD score performs slightly worse than HoneyAgent on the Contagio dataset, and slightly worse on the VirusTotal dataset. 
Static vs Dynamic
A comparison of our best static results with those obtained with HoneyAgent is given in the form of a bar graph in Figure 2 . Although the dynamic HoneyAgent technique achieves strong results, our experimental results clearly show that static techniques can perform as well, if not better.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we compared static malware detection techniques based on Hidden Markov Models [22] , Bytecode Graph Similarity [15] , and Simple Substitution Distance [16] , to a dynamic scoring technique known as HoneyAgent [10] . These static scoring techniques were tested on the same malicious Java applets as in the HoneyAgent paper. Our results show that the static scores produce better results than those obtained using the dynamic HoneyAgent technique. The Btyecode Graph Similarity score is particularly impressive in our tests. These results indicate that the additional cost of dynamic analysis is unlikely to be warranted, at least for these particular datasets. Of course, there may be more challenging datasets for which the dynamic score yields significantly better results than a static score. In any case, there is a fairly substantial body of research indicating that various static scoring techniques perform well against advanced metamorphic malware [2, 7, 13, 15, 16, 19, 22] , so it is not too surprising that these techniques give strong results when applied to obfuscated Java applets.
For future work, it would be worthwhile to experiment with combinations of the HMM, BGS, and SSD scoressuch combinations could likely perform significantly better than the individual scores. Support Vector Machines (SVM) would provide a straightforward technique for generating optimized score combinations. In addition, some of the other static scores cited in the previous paragraph could be analyzed in the context of Java applets. Some of these scores have been shown to do better in certain cases than the scores considered in this paper.
It would be very interesting to find a malware dataset for which a dynamic technique such as HoneyAgent clearly outperforms the static approaches considered in this paper. And, if such a real-world malware dataset cannot be found, it would be worthwhile to construct such a dataset, since this exercise would likely provide a better understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of dynamic analysis as compared to static analysis.
